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Multilevel environmental
governance in the
United States
Erin Ryan discusses the benefits of a dynamic multilevel
governance approach by the US Government for cross- and
inter-state environmental management.

T

he intensity of multilevel environmental
governance disputes reflects inexorable
pressure on all levels of government to meet
the increasingly complicated challenges of regulation
in an ever more interconnected world. In the United
States (US), debate over the responsibilities of different
levels of government are framed within our system
of constitutional federalism, which divides sovereign
power between the central federal administration and
regional states1. Dilemmas about devolution have been
erupting in all regulatory contexts, but environmental
governance remains uniquely prone to federalism
discord because it inevitably confronts the core question
with which federalism grapples—“who gets to decide?”—
in contexts where state and federal claims to power are
simultaneously at their strongest.
Environmental problems tend to match the need to
regulate the harmful use of specific lands (among the
most sacred of local prerogatives) with the need to
regulate border-crossing harms caused by these uses
(among the strongest of national prerogatives). As a
result, it is often impossible to solve the problem without
engaging authority on both ends of the spectrum—and
disputes erupt when local and national ideas on how best
to proceed diverge. Ongoing jurisdictional controversies
in energy policy, pollution law, and natural resource
management reveal environmental law as the canary
in federalism’s coal mine, showcasing the underlying
reasons for jurisdictional conflict in all areas of law.
Wrestling with these incendiary tensions at the
intersection of local land use and spillover harm,
environmental federalism helpfully exposes the fault
lines underlying the American federal system to
analysis—but also the available tools for coping with
them. American environmental law has developed
structural means of managing these tensions which may
be instructive for other devolution conflicts or claims
for decentralised environmental decision-making in
other jurisdictions. This article suggests a few potential
lessons from the American experience.
In the US, environmental governance often contends
with jurisdictional controversy through programmes of
cooperative federalism, in which state and federal actors
take responsibility for separate but interlocking roles
within an overarching regulatory programme1. Statutes
engage regulatory stakeholders across multiscalar lines,
allocating responsibility according to the distinctive
strengths of local and national capacity, seeking the best
balance of flexibility, durability, and responsiveness for
each individual context. Intergovernmental partnerships
may involve direct state-federal cooperation, but
they are often mediated by statutory structures that
asymmetrically allocate decision-making authority
within programmes of coordinated capacity,
federally-supported state implementation, conditional
pre-emption, and permitting programmes.
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COORDINATED CAPACITY
These programmes partner distinct regulatory skillsets
of state and federal actors to operate independently in
a shared regulatory space. For example, the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act engages
state and local experts in coordinated planning for
chemical and other emergencies2. It harnesses local
capacity by requiring each state to establish an
Emergency Response Commission drawing on technical
expertise from all relevant state agencies3. It partners
local expertise with federal capacity by authorising
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require
compliance by all relevant facilities with the emergency
planning provisions created by each state’s commission3.
This structure drew praise as an early cooperative
federalism model, enhancing interjurisdictional synergy
by trading a fully federalised response for one enabling
more expert state implementation4. However, it was
also criticised for not allowing states to opt out of
participation in favour of direct federal regulation5.
FEDERALLY SUPPORTED STATE IMPLEMENTATION
In more complex programmes, the federal government
often negotiates for local participation in multilevel
governance through conditional spending, offering
financial and technical resources to persuade states
to help implement federal goals and to facilitate state

accomplishment of related regulatory goals6. These
programmes are attractive to the federal government
because they enable Congress to negotiate with states
for policymaking influence in regulatory realms that
lie beyond more directly constitutionally enumerated
federal powers7. They are attractive to states because
they come with fiscal incentives and enable state choice,
enhancing the potential for jurisdictional synergy while
maintaining respect for local autonomy. For example,
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) enables
each state to accept or reject the proposed partnership,
because the law provides for no federal intervention if the
state declines the federal invitation8,9. Another example is
the Superfund Act, a federally administered programme
that imposes liability for hazardous substances, but
authorises discretionary grants to encourage state
participation and leadership in clean-up efforts10.
CONDITIONAL PREEMPTION
A classic model of cooperative federalism pioneered by
environmental law is that of conditional preemption, by
which the federal government sets goals or standards
that may be implemented by either state or federal
actors. This model invites the states to participate in
accomplishing an overall regulatory goal by tailoring
the implementation of federal standards in the way
that best suits local political, geographic, economic, and

demographic circumstances. However, if a state declines
to participate, the federal government will regulate
in-state activity directly, preempting any conflicting
state law. These programmes safeguard a centralised
response while opening possibilities for preserving local
autonomy and fostering interjurisdictional synergy.
Many environmental laws deploy federally-supported
state implementation and conditional pre-emption
simultaneously, inviting state participation but
guaranteeing a federal fall back if a state declines the
invitation. For example, the Clean Air Act—perhaps
uniquely among environmental law—uses conditional
spending as less of a carrot and more of a stick. The Act
establishes National Ambient Air Quality Standards
and anticipates that states will design and administer
State Implementation Plans for attaining them. If they
do not, the federal government will eventually do so
using a Federal Implementation Plan. In the meanwhile,
non-compliant states may suffer the loss of federal
highway funds offered under a related conditional
spending partnership11. The design of the Clean Air
Act reflects its architects’ intentions that the federal
government remains the clear senior partner, reserving
dominant centralised authority to resolve a collective
national problem. After all, air pollution results not
only from activities solidly rooted in one place, but also
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from countless mobile sources (both domestically and
internationally) that are less meaningfully related to
local expertise and land use authority12.
SHARED AND GENERAL PERMITTING PROGRAMMES.
Most state/federal partnerships follow a model similar
to the Clean Air Act, in which federal judgment usually
trumps on regulatory goals and standards, while local
judgment usually gets federal deference on matters of
design and implementation that account for diverse local
circumstances. In fact, environmental law has pioneered
different ways of formalising this asymmetrical
allocation of state and federal authority through its
different approaches to shared and general permitting
programmes. In shared permitting programmes like
those of the Clean Air and Water Acts, state and federal
actors share authority for permitting private activity
that implicates the overarching regulatory goal. In
addition, general permitting programmes provide
a streamlined means of negotiating the satisfaction
of regulatory goals when governmental actors are
themselves permit applicants.
General permits enable applicants to obtain permission
to engage in regulated activity by following a general
set of instructions that provide specific guidance about
acceptable and unacceptable activity13. An under-sung
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tool of cooperative federalism, they can maximise local
discretion and minimise the overall regulatory burden
on both ends, by facilitating locally tailored resolutions
within exacting national guidelines. For example, the
Army Corps of Engineers uses a general permit to protect
wetlands under the Clean Water Act, allowing countless
public and private actors to obtain land use permission
with minimal regulatory oversight but according to a
specified set of regulatory guidance13,14. The Clean Water
Act also authorises municipal storm water discharges
under a general permitting programme15,16,17.
LESSONS FROM DYNAMIC FEDERALISM
The conventional tools of cooperative federalism provide
critical forums for regulatory collaboration in realms
of legitimate jurisdictional overlap, where the need for
strong centralised response is matched by strong local

FEATURE
capacity rooted in the states’ pre-constitutional police
power. Indeed, environmental scholars—especially
among the emerging dynamic federalism literature—are
increasingly emphasising the values of overlap, fluidity,
exchange, and negotiation among separately regulating
local, state, and federal actors (see Box 1).

BOX 1. BALANCED FEDERALISM
Innovations in federalism theory, such as the Balanced Federalism
model I’ve set forth in previous work, advocate for dynamic
interaction among the various levels of government. For example,
Balanced Federalism emphasises shared interpretive responsibility
among both branches and levels of government, to achieve a
balance among the competing values of multilevel governance that
is both dynamic and adaptive over time1.

Drawing on these insights, governance architects could
capitalise on the existing asymmetrical allocation
of authority to more effectively engage insight and
capacity at the local level, and to more strategically
allocate roles among executive, legislative, and judicial
decision-makers where each is most able. Federalism
theory should also push regulators to recognise that
many of the difficult jurisdictional dynamics that are
formally recognised within state-federal relations are
equally meaningful in municipal-state relations. While
the US Constitution falsely presumes that municipal
interests are synonymous with that of their state,
federalism controversies over fracking and other energy
harvesting, especially reveals intrastate conflicts. In
addition, architects designing new regulatory models
must consider all implicated governance values18,
weighing carefully whether any one takes priority

over another. The more all values are in equipoise,
the more the regulatory framework should allow for
adaptive management through ongoing deliberation
among regulatory stakeholders.
A key lesson of environmental governance is that
there is no one size to fit all regulatory needs, and
different federalism values may take priority under
different circumstances. For example, the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA) establishes a federal statutory
framework that enables multiple iterations of open
bargaining between state and federal executive actors
toward corresponding state legislation, providing a
good example of how to integrate state/federal and
legislative/executive capacity toward uniquely tailored
regulatory endpoints, where place-based local diversity
is the determinative factor19. A very different model is

“A key lesson of environmental
governance is that there is no
one size to fit all regulatory
needs, and different federalism
values may take priority under
different circumstances.”
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taken by the Clean Air Act’s mechanism for regulating
motor vehicle emissions, which enables states to follow
either the federal or California standard, in order to limit
the variability of regulation within the national market
of automobile manufacturing while still enabling the
benefits of regulatory competition20. This model enables
effective dynamic interaction within a more centralised
regime, in which the constraints of a national market are
the most critical factor21.
With so many considerations at play, it is hard to
imagine environmental law—or any federalism-sensitive
governance—reaching a definitive answer to the question
of “who should decide?”. Strictly segregating state and
federal efforts in interjurisdictional contexts is unlikely
to work well, as demonstrated by failed environmental
governance in the US over non-point source water
pollution 22. Yet leaving jurisdictional matters fully
unresolved can also have serious consequences. Doctrinal
uncertainty may deter effective regulatory problem
solving where it is needed, if regulators fear becoming
embroiled in legal challenges to their assertion of
contested authority, as occurred during American efforts
to regulate radioactive waste23. Alternatively, doctrinal
uncertainty can encourage self-serving regulatory
abdication, if all levels of government cast the regulatory
dilemma as someone else’s responsibility24.

Heeding these lessons, well-crafted multiscalar
governance belies the perverse presumption of “zero-sum
federalism,” which assumes that the allocation of
decision-making authority among levels and agents
of government is always a zero-sum game25. Defying
the presumption that authority exercised by one is
categorically removed from others, environmental
governance has experimented with different ways of
enhance authority among multiple agents simultaneously,
through structured programmes of consultation
and exchange. This empirical assault on the mythos
of zero-sum federalism warrants emphasis, drawing
attention to what most American federalism actually
looks like in practice, and how federalism in practice
increasingly departs from the rhetoric of conventional
federalism theory25,26.
CONCLUSION
In the end, perhaps the problem that stymies all
federalism-sensitive governance is the assumption
underlying the question with which we began. “Who
should decide?” presumes a simple answer, and in contexts
of profound jurisdictional overlap, there is rarely a simple
answer. American environmental federalism has shown
that the best response is often to inform interjurisdictional
governance with multiple perspectives as feasibly
as possible, through ongoing processes of exchange,

adaptation, and negotiation among stakeholders at all
levels of jurisdictional scale. Balanced federalism suggests
that similar principles apply to the allocation of decision
making authority along the horizontal separation of
powers. Good interjurisdictional governance engages
not only the distinctive capacity at different levels of
government vertically, but from the different branches of
government within each level. Legislative, executive, and
judicial coordination at all levels of scale are needed to
manage the difficult trade-offs that federalism-sensitive
governance always has, and always will, require of us.
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